Trusted domain information was modified
Active Directory trust properties, SID filtering, or direction settings were updated.
Event ID 4716 logs changes to existing domain trust relationships (`Trust Attributes`, `Trust Direction`, or `SID Filtering`). Disabling SID filtering or altering trust attributes across forest/domain boundaries enables adversaries with compromised child domains to forge SID History (`SID Hopping`) and compromise the root forest.
Failure Reason / Root Cause:
Modification of domain trust object (`TrustedDomainName` properties updated).
Raw Event XML snippet
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
<System>
<Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}" />
<EventID>4716</EventID>
<Version>0</Version>
<Level>0</Level>
<Task>12544</Task>
<Opcode>0</Opcode>
<Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords>
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2026-07-17T09:54:44.886Z" />
<EventRecordID>1048576</EventRecordID>
<Correlation />
<Execution ProcessID="612" ThreadID="1024" />
<Channel>Security</Channel>
<Computer>DC01.enterprise.internal</Computer>
<Security />
</System>
<EventData>
<Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-5-18</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectUserName">SYSTEM</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectDomainName">NT AUTHORITY</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x3e7</Data>
<!-- Event telemetry fields specific to Trusted domain information was modified -->
</EventData>
</Event>MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
T1134.005 | Account Manipulation: SID-History Injection | Persistence |
T1550 | Use Alternate Authentication Material | Lateral Movement |
Recommended actions
- Audit `Trust Attributes` changes. Alert immediately if SID filtering (`TDO_BUS_REQUIRE_SSL` or quarantine flags) is disabled across forest trusts.